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I. INTRODUCTION
Heather Wiseman worked as a Wal-Mart sales floor associate for almost a
1
year prior to her pregnancy. While pregnant, Wiseman experienced urinary tract

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2013; B.A., Sociology,
University of California, Los Angeles, 2009. I would like to thank Professor Ruth Jones for generously making
time to inspire, guide, and enrich the development of this Comment. I would also like to thank Andrew, my
parents, Graham, and Leeza, for unwavering love, support, and encouragement.
1. Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9,
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and bladder infections. Her doctor advised her to consume more water
3
throughout the day and instructed her to carry a water bottle while at work. Then
the store changed its policy to specifically “prohibit non-cashier employees from
4
carrying water bottles, and it told [Wiseman] to stop carrying one.” Wiseman’s
infections returned due to lack of hydration, so she obtained a doctor’s note
5
instructing Wal-Mart to allow Wiseman to carry a water bottle at work. WalMart rejected the note and subsequently Wiseman began working in the fitting
room, where she was further restricted from accessing the store’s water
6
fountains.
With no other option, Wiseman was forced to carry a water bottle again or
7
else risk her health and that of her child. As a result, Wal-Mart terminated
8
Wiseman’s employment for “insubordination.” Wiseman brought a suit against
9
Wal-Mart. Unfortunately, under existing law, Wal-Mart was within their legal
10
rights to take such action. Wiseman’s claims under the Family Medical Leave
11
12
Act (FMLA) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) were insufficient to
13
provide a remedy.
Enacted in 1978, the PDA amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act with the
purpose of eliminating employment decisions based on pregnancy and promoting
14
workplace equality for women affected by pregnancy. Unfortunately, under the
structural parameters of the PDA, pregnant women are judged by exactly the
15
same standards as both non-pregnant women and men. While this pregnancy16
blind treatment may be considered desirable if a woman experiences no side
2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. (stating that her infections “reoccurred due to a lack of hydration”).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See infra note 13 (describing the court’s reasoning in rejecting Wiseman’s claim).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, (k).
13. The court rejected Wiseman’s FMLA claim because her complaint failed to meet the requisite
number of hours worked and she did not allege either one of the two FMLA causes of action: retaliation or
interference. Wiseman, 2009 WL 1617669 at *2 (describing why neither cause of action applies to Wiseman’s
case). Additionally, although the court did not address Wiseman’s pregnancy discrimination claim, it likely
would have failed due to the current state of the law and its focus on a comparison approach. See infra Part
IV.A (explaining the PDA’s comparison-based approach for evaluating discrimination claims).
14. 124 CONG. REC. 11839, 21435–37 (1978) [hereinafter CONG. REC.].
15. Id. (Pregnant women “shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .”).
16. CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 21436–37. “Desirable” pregnancy-blind treatment refers to the
specific discrimination the PDA intended to eliminate—discrimination on the basis of pregnancy resulting in
adverse employment actions based solely on this condition. Id. For instance, it is desirable for an employer to
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effects, even healthy pregnancies may affect a woman’s ability to work. This is
because a completely symptom-free pregnancy does not exist based on the very
18
nature of pregnancy. Moreover, women experience conditions related to their
reproductive capacities, which courts have found fall outside the scope of the
19
PDA. Therefore, women’s reproductive capacities present unique conditions
requiring accommodation in order to allow women to achieve these equal
employment opportunities.
20
The female’s unique anatomy is essential to reproductive ability. Women
bear the physical burdens of reproductive choices between couples. First, women
alone experience the physical bodily changes that occur during pregnancy.
Likewise, if infertility treatments are involved, the woman most often
21
experiences the higher health risks and side effects.
Issues involving pregnancy in the workplace will likely become more
22
prevalent as more women decide to work. As of 2010, women, in general,
23
comprised forty-seven percent of the total labor force. According to the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, eighty percent of working women will become pregnant
24
during their working lives. These statistics show the high rate of participation of
women in the workforce who will be affected by their unique reproductive
capacity.
“Equal employment opportunity” focuses on an individual’s right not to be
discriminated against by an employer (or potential employer) based on one of the
25
several specifically enumerated protected characteristics. “Equal Employment
Opportunity is a principle that asserts that all people should have the right to
work and advance on the bases of merit and ability, regardless of their race, sex,
overlook a woman’s pregnancy in making a hiring decision when the woman is capable of work. Id.
17. See infra Part V.A (listing the side effects that occur with all pregnancies, such as hormonal changes
and fetal movement).
18. Id.
19. See infra Part IV.B (identifying the PDA’s failure to cover biologically related functions and
physiological effects of pregnancy).
20. Female Reproductive System, EDUCATION.COM, http://www.education.com/reference/article/Ref_
Female_Reproductive/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing the unique
aspects of the female reproductive system, which facilitate pregnancy).
21. See infra Part IV.B.2 (detailing the higher risks of infertility treatments for women in comparison to
men).
22. See Stephanie Armour, Pregnant Workers Report Growing Discrimination, USA TODAY (Feb. 16,
2005, 9:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-02-16-pregnancy-bias-usat_x.htm (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The rise in pregnancy discrimination cases is important now because more
women of child-bearing age are in the labor force . . . .”).
23. Women in the Labor Force in 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/Qflaborforce-10.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
24. Pregnancy in the Workplace, INC., http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/pregnancy-in-the-workplace
.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
25. See Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the role of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in enforcing laws prohibiting such discrimination).

517

08_OYOUNG_VER_01_7-20-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/29/2013 10:17 AM

2013 / Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace
26

color, religion, disability, national origin, or age.” Better protection, in the form
of reasonable accommodations for reproductive capacity, will expand the
opportunities for women to remain in the workforce.
27
The PDA, as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, follows a comparison
28
framework in evaluating discrimination claims. Courts look for “equal
29
treatment” based on an evaluation of whether the employee claiming
discrimination was treated less favorably in comparison to another employee who
is “similarly situated” but for the particular characteristic that is the basis of the
30
discrimination claim. Under this theory, pregnant women are viewed as
indistinguishable from others in a similarly situated class, or individuals “similar
31
to the complainant in all respects but for the protected characteristic.”
Men and women should be allowed to compete freely and on an equal basis
in the workplace; however, current laws do not promote this idea because they do
not take into account the reality that women uniquely experience the physical
side effects of pregnancy. The PDA does not provide adequate protection, due to
its limited coverage of the effects of gestation and birth, as well as its enactment
as an amendment to Title VII (which focuses on comparison to a similarly
situated class). This Comment argues for a federal law that requires employers to
provide reasonable accommodations for employees who experience conditions
related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related reproductive conditions.
Part II begins with the social context of employment discrimination against
women, which led to the need for equal employment laws. Part III provides an
overview of the case law leading up to the need for the PDA and a brief
description of the PDA’s enactment, structure, and effect. Part IV addresses
specific ways in which the PDA insufficiently protects women due to the Act’s
comparator-based approach. Finally, Part V discusses the necessity of a new law

26. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY, http://www.cdc.
gov/diversity/equalopportunity/index.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). Title VII prohibits employers from making hiring or firing decisions or
otherwise discriminating against individuals based on their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”; or
otherwise adversely affect their employment status based on these characteristics. Id. § 2000e-2.
28. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 763 (2011) (“[C]ourts
have transformed the comparator methodology into the substantive law of discrimination.”).
29. Nicholas Smith, A Critique of Recent Approaches to Discrimination Law, 2007 N.Z. LAW REV. 499,
504 (2007).
30. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 613 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
31. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 731, 759 (citing to Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th
Cir. 1994)). In Troupe, the plaintiff was fired for tardiness due to morning sickness and was unable to prevail in
her case for failure to provide an example of a similarly situated class. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735. The court held
that the PDA does not require employers to make it any easier for pregnant women to work than it is for their
similarly situated co-workers. Id. at 738. Judge Posner explained that a similarly situated class would consist of
a male who was as tardy as the plaintiff due to health problems and about to take a paid sick leave as a result of
those problems. Id. As this case demonstrates, the possibility of a plaintiff finding a similarly situated class
against which to compare her situation presents a difficult task. But see id. at 739 (“We doubt that finding a
comparison group would be that difficult.”).
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that recognizes an accommodation approach rather than a comparative approach
to women’s reproductive functions. This Part utilizes the Americans with
Disabilities Act as a model of a currently existing law that requires
accommodations for employees with certain conditions, which are very similar in
32
effect to pregnancy and related reproductive functions. In addition, this Part
33
refers to current California law for a specific example of a pregnancy
accommodation law, which may be modified in order to apply on the federal
level.
II. HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
Section A provides the historical backdrop of women in the workplace
beginning in the early twentieth century. This Section details women’s entrance
into the workforce and the important implications that resulted. More
specifically, this Section traces the growing need and expectation of equality for
women especially with respect to employment opportunities. Section B describes
the enactment of Title VII and reveals the sexism involved in the drafting of this
landmark law.
A. Women in the Workforce Prior to Title VII
In the early twentieth century, women worked predominantly in the home,
34
while some participated in the labor force. The dominant social view at the time
35
was that women should stay “within the home as wives and mothers.” Even
when women did participate in the workforce, their presence remained “limited
36
by cultural beliefs [and] social practices . . . that subordinated women to men.”
As a class, women earned noticeably lower wages than men and filled the lower37
paying occupations. Women were also subjected to harsh and unsafe working
38
conditions at much lower rates than men, as a result of this perceived
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2011) (defining “disability” in the ADA regulations as “[a] physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits . . . manual tasks . . . eating, sleeping, walking, standing, . . . lifting,
bending, . . . breathing, . . . concentrating, thinking, . . . and working.”).
33. CAL. GOV’T CODE §12945 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012).
34. A History of Women in Industry, NAT’L WOMEN’S HIST. MUSEUM 7, http://www.nwhm.org/onlineexhibits/industry/womenindustry_intro.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). Readers of this historical account of women in the workforce should note that lower class AfricanAmerican and immigrant women already worked outside of their home as a matter of economic necessity and
socially mandated conditions. See id. (“At the end of the 19th century, most women workers were non-white.”).
35. Id. at 1.
36. Jeanne Boydston, Women in the Labor Force, AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE, http://www.anb.org/
cush_wlabor.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
37. Id. While the wage gap between women and men has been slowly increasing, women still earned
23% less than men in 2010. A Brief History of Pay Inequity, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, http://www.aauw.
org/act/laf/library/payequity_hist.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
38. A History of Women in Industry, supra note 34, at 9 “[W]omen typically worked 12 to 14 hours, 7
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inferiority. On average, women’s wages amounted to a mere sixty percent of
40
that earned by men.
Employment conditions remained dismal and employment discrimination
41
against women persisted even as women increasingly entered the labor force.
According to the National Women’s History Museum, as women increasingly
left the home to join the paid workforce, they experienced heavy criticism and
42
discrimination. More specifically, during the Great Depression, the American
43
public viewed working women as stealing potential jobs from men. The media
44
also attacked working women for “abandoning their families,” thus, reinforcing
45
the notion of women’s roles as homemaker first and worker second. Laws that
46
preferred men to women also perpetuated the discrimination. Consequently,
many public employers “nationwide began to fire and refuse to hire married
47
women.”
During World War II, many men left to serve in the armed forces, which
48
resulted in a labor shortage. Responding to this shortage, women began
49
performing traditionally male-held jobs in factories and on production lines.
Although many women were terminated after the war ended and men returned
home, “there were lasting effects” of women’s participation in traditionally male50
held jobs. Women were inspired by a belief in their right to receive fair working
51
conditions. “Women had proven that they could do the job and within a few
52
decades, women in the workforce became a common sight.”

days a week at a sewing machine in a factory without central heating, electricity, or ventilation.” Id. As a result
of the conditions, “women often suffered from serious workplace injuries . . . and contagious illnesses that
spread quickly . . . in the cramped factories.” Id.
39. See id. at 7.
40. Id.
41. See id. (referring to women’s consistently lower wages and poor working conditions).
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. (referring to the media’s backlash against women for leaving the home and entering the
workforce).
46. For instance, Congress enacted the Federal Economy Act, which excluded “a married woman from
working in civil service if her husband did as well.” Id.
47. Id.
48. Women in the Work Force During World War II, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/south
east/education/resources-by-state/wwii-women.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. A History of Women in Industry, supra note 34, at 8.
52. Women in the Work Force During World War II, supra note 48.
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B. The Enactment of Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to achieve equal
employment opportunities for individuals with certain specifically protected
53
characteristics. The characteristics protected under Title VII include “race,
54
color, religion, sex, [and] national origin.” Title VII explicitly prohibits
employers from discriminating “because of” or “on the basis of” these
55
enumerated characteristics.
Many viewed the addition of “a sex discrimination provision to Title VII as
56
little more than a ‘joke’ or a political ploy.” As one court noted: “The sex
discrimination prohibition was added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil
57
rights opponent Howard W. Smith.” Conservative civil rights opponents such as
Smith believed that the inclusion of sex as a protected characteristic would result
58
in the bill’s defeat. The manner in which sex discrimination became a part of
Title VII corroborates the long struggle women have faced in achieving equal
59
employment opportunities.
III. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
Section A explains the employment conditions for pregnant working women
in the period of time after the 1964 enactment of Title VII. Section B describes
Congress’s clarification to Title VII with its 1978 enactment of the PDA.
A. Pre-Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Even after Congress enacted Title VII, women continued to be deprived of
equal employment opportunities because employers regularly discriminated
60
based on pregnancy. Employers considered pregnancy in making employment
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006) (providing for the establishment of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission).
54. Id. § 2000e-2.
55. Id.
56. Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex
Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 137 (1997) (citing Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
57. Id. at 137 n.4 (quoting Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36).
58. Id. (citing Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace?
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 409 n.62 (1996)).
59. But see Epstein, supra note 58, at 409 n.62 (arguing that passage of the item demonstrates the
perceived merit of protecting against sex discrimination); Bird, supra note 56, at 138 (“Congress added sex as a
result of subtle political pressure from individuals, who for varying reasons, were serious about protecting the
rights of women.”).
60. See CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 11839 (indicating that a significant number of employers force
women to stop working even when they are able to continue, and citing many employers’ imposition of an
arbitrary date to return to work “based on the stereotypical notions that women are unable to continue working
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decisions such as hiring, firing, and wage determinations. Employers also
terminated employment or forced women to take mandatory maternity leave at
62
arbitrary points in their pregnancy. Many pregnant women were forced to take
mandatory maternity leave despite their capability and desire to continue
63
working. For example, General Electric required pregnant women to take leave
“three months prior to birth and [they were] not permitted to return until six
64
weeks after the birth.” Further revealing the discriminatory practices against
pregnant women, this policy of mandatory leave despite physical ability to work
65
was not applied to any other employees—just pregnant women.
In response to the continuing discrimination against pregnant women,
66
women began bringing actions against their employers. In 1974, the United
67
States Supreme Court decided Geduldig v. Aiello. This was the first time the
Court addressed whether discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is
68
unconstitutional gender discrimination.
In Geduldig, California’s disability insurance system excluded coverage for
69
disabilities caused by pregnancy. Plaintiffs, four women denied disability
benefits due to pregnancy complications, challenged California’s disability
insurance program as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
70
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Under the applicable
constitutional law of the time, the plaintiffs bore the burden of “showing that
distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an
71
invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.” If
plaintiffs could not meet this burden, pregnancy could be excluded from
72
insurance coverage “on any reasonable basis . . . .”

or do not desire to return to work”).
61. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 149–50 n.1 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(indicating General Electric’s decision to pay lower wages to women based on pregnancy and “other
considerations”); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634–36 (1974) (forcing pregnant
employees to take mandatory maternity leave at the beginning of their fifth month despite their willingness and
ability to continue working).
62. CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 21435; Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 149–50 n.1.
63. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. at 636.
64. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 149–50 n.1.
65. Id.
66. See Sandra Pullman, Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU (Mar. 7,
2006), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff (last visited July 5,
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the numerous gender discrimination lawsuits leading up
to the enactment of the PDA).
67. 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1976).
68. Diane L. Zimmerman, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex
Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 442 (1975).
69. 417 U.S. at 486.
70. Id. at 486 n.20, 487.
71. Id. at 496 n.20.
72. Id.
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The Court held that the policy’s exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it did not involve
discrimination against a definable protected group; the policy only discriminated
73
against pregnant women rather than all women. While recognizing that only
women become pregnant, it reasoned that the insurance program drew a
74
distinction between “pregnant women” and “nonpregnant persons.” “The
California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition—pregnancy—
75
from the list of compensable disabilities.”
The Court concluded that “[t]here is no risk from which men are protected
and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected
76
and men are not.” In support, the Court noted that, “[w]hile [pregnant persons
are] exclusively female, the [category of nonpregnant persons] includes members
77
of both sexes.” In order to reach this conclusion, the court relied on a
78
categorization of “pregnant” versus “nonpregnant persons.” It then compared
these two groups and found that women also fall into both the “pregnant” and
79
“nonpregnant” categories, thus no gender discrimination occurred. By
categorizing the groups for comparison, the designation of pregnant or non80
pregnant persons allowed employers to make decisions based on pregnancy.
Notably, Geduldig did not create an immediate need to address pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII because it was brought as a constitutional Equal
81
Protection case and not a Title VII action. The need to examine pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII soon arose; in 1976, the Supreme Court relied on
the Geduldig interpretation of non-pregnant persons in deciding General Electric
82
Co. v. Gilbert.
In General Electric Co., employees sued as a class because the company’s
insurance plan excluded coverage of pregnancy-related disabilities, while
covering other non-occupational situations such as vasectomies, cosmetic
83
surgeries, and sports-related injuries. The class members alleged that excluding

73. Id. at 497.
74. Id. at 496 n.20.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 484.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 496 n.20.
79. Id.
80. See Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. REV. 375, 380 (1981) (quoting L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16–27, at 1071 (1978)) (“Thus, under Geduldig, ‘the link of the
excluded disability [due to pregnancy] was to be treated as essentially coincidental.’”).
81. Decisional Background of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Employment Discrimination (MB) 347, at § 47.02 (2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
82. 429 U.S. 125, 133–34 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484).
83. Id. at 127, 151–52.
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pregnancy coverage constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII’s
84
prohibition against gender discrimination.
The Court rejected this argument and held that exclusion of pregnancy from
85
insurance coverage does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. It
explained that a “prima facie violation of Title VII can be established in some
circumstances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or
86
classification is to discriminate against members of one class or another.” The
Court’s holding was based on the Geduldig “nonpregnant persons” distinction in
order to assert that exclusion of pregnancy “is not a gender-based discrimination
87
at all,” and, thus, the class of women was not specifically discriminated
88
against. The majority noted that the financial benefits of the plan paid out
89
equally to men and women. It further justified non-coverage by distinguishing
pregnancy from other covered diseases and disabilities by classifying pregnancy
90
as a “voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.” Despite Title VII, the
General Electric Co. ruling permitted sex discrimination, which allowed unfair
91
treatment based on pregnancy—a uniquely female reproductive function.
B. Enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
Congress enacted the PDA as an amendment to Title VII in direct response to
92
the Court’s ruling in General Electric Co. The law explicitly states that under
Title VII, discrimination “‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’” also includes
circumstances that occur “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
93
related medical conditions.” Furthermore, the PDA states that women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions “shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
94
inability to work . . . .”

84. Id. at 129.
85. Id. at 145–46.
86. Id. at 137.
87. Id. at 136.
88. Id. at 145–46.
89. Id. at 139 n.17.
90. Id. at 136.
91. Id. at 145–46.
92. See generally CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 21435–36 (multiple speakers stating that General
Electric Co. necessitates clarification that Congress intended discrimination on the basis of sex to include
pregnancy discrimination); see also id. at 34292–94 (including an article in the record titled “General Electric
Company v. Gilbert: The Plight of the Working Woman”).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
94. Id.
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Despite Congress’s stated intention of alleviating employment discrimination
95
on the basis of pregnancy, the PDA is insufficient to provide equal employment
opportunities to women. This insufficiency arises because the PDA does not
cover certain reproductive conditions that women experience and it applies a
96
comparative analysis in evaluating discrimination claims. In addition, the PDA
only addresses pregnancy discrimination and, thus, fails to address the situation
in which reasonable accommodations would allow a woman to continue her
97
employment, despite her unique reproductive capacity.
IV. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PDA
This Part will explain in more detail the application of the comparator
approach in order to argue that the PDA provides inadequate protection.
A. The Comparator Approach Fails to Adequately Address Women’s
Reproductive Capacity
The PDA utilizes a comparator-based analysis, which requires a plaintiff to
identify a similarly situated non-pregnant individual who received better
98
treatment. An employer may deny accommodations for pregnancy and still
comply with the PDA if their actions result in “treat[ing] nonpregnant employees
99
the same as pregnant employees.” Since employers are only required to
recognize women’s reproductive capacities to the extent that they accommodate
100
other conditions, this allows an employer to treat all employees poorly and
101
never accommodate reproductive capacities. While this may seem fair initially,
when considering that only women will ever experience the consequences of
95. In enacting Title VII’s PDA, Congress wanted to “insure that genuine equality in the American labor
force is more than an illusion and that pregnancy will no longer be the basis of unfavorable treatment of
working women.” CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 21435–37 (statement of Representative Augustus F. Hawkins).
96. See infra Part IV (detailing the insufficiencies of the PDA).
97. For instance, Heather Wiseman could have carried her own water bottle at no cost to the employer.
This would have allowed her to continue working and productively contributing to the labor force. Wiseman v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009).
98. Goldberg, supra note 28.
99. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2011). In Serednyj, the
employer denied providing temporary accommodations for all non-work related injuries. Id. at 545–47. Since
the policy distinguished between work-related and non-work related injuries, they were allowed to classify
pregnancy as non-work related. Id. at 548. The court found that this policy treated non-pregnant employees the
same as pregnant employees and was, thus, permissible under the PDA. Id. at 552.
100. See Facts About Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-preg.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(explaining that an employer must treat an employee with pregnancy disabilities the same as it would treat any
other temporarily disabled employee).
101. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act does not . . . require employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier
for pregnant women to work . . . .”).
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their unique reproductive capacity, it becomes clear that the current state of the
law can systematically prevent women, as a class, from achieving equal
employment opportunities.
A major problem with current law is that there is no similarly situated class
102
to pregnant women. In pregnancy and female reproductive issues, “there can be
no precise comparator by reason of the different reproductive capacities of men
103
and women . . . .” Because symptoms and conditions vary among pregnant
104
women, and even between pregnancies for the same woman, finding a similarly
105
situated non-pregnant person is often not possible.
Many legitimate pregnancy discrimination claims fail due to the inability to
106
find a legally acceptable comparator. Even when a woman may continue
working with the aid of a temporary accommodation, an employer may terminate
her employment if they do not already provide accommodations to similarly
107
situated employees. As such, pregnant women may face a difficult choice
between remaining in the workforce and receiving equal employment
opportunities or leaving the workforce in order to protect their health or the
health of their children. Sadly, pregnant women who are capable of continuing
108
work if provided a reasonable accommodation may instead be fired.
102. Janna L. Grossman, The Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act: Accommodating the Needs of Pregnant
Working Women, JUSTIA (May 11, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/05/11/the-pregnant-workers-fairnessact (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
103. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 761.
104. See infra Part V.A (providing examples of different symptoms that are not experienced by all
pregnant women).
105. See Grossman, supra note 102 (noting that courts have not accepted comparisons to “employees
who receive accommodations mandated by the [ADA]”).
106. See Goldberg, supra note 28, at 735 (arguing that many forms of discrimination are not heard due
to the rare existence of a “sufficiently close comparator”).
107. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the PDA does
not require employers to make it any easier for pregnant women to work than it is for their similarly situated coworkers). Judge Posner explained that a similarly situated class would consist of a male plaintiff whose health
problems caused him to be as late and about to take a paid sick leave as a result of those problems. Id. at 738;
see also Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2011). In Serednyj, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s proposed comparators and found her PDA claim insufficient. Id. at 548–52. For instance,
one woman suffered disc degeneration in her back and took two leaves of absence to recover. Id. at 551. That
woman had taken FMLA leave, which Serednyj did not qualify for because she had not worked at Beverly long
enough. Id. at 546. The court also rejected comparison to Pam Seibert, a speech therapist who required frequent
breaks due to a medical condition. Id. at 552. Seibert was not considered a proper comparator because she was
hired as an independent contractor rather than a direct employee of Beverly. Id. Gina Sizemore, a pregnant
woman fired for not being able to return to full working capacity upon returning from FMLA leave, presented
another rejected comparator because the court found that this case showed Beverly applying its modified work
policy uniformly. Id. This uniform application of the modified work policy results in permitting systematic
exclusion of pregnant women requiring accommodations from the workplace.
108. See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4 RM, 2010 WL 1568606, at *1 (N.D. Ind.
Apr. 16, 2010). Rearranging tables and transporting residents to and from activities, the tasks for which the
plaintiff needed accommodation, each required five to ten minutes per day. Id. at *1. In addition, although her
co-workers already assisted her with these activities prior to pregnancy and the only necessary accommodation
required was the formality of stating that other co-workers must help her in these tasks, the employer was still
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B. Non-Coverage of Biologically Related Functions and Physiological Effects
As the PDA only addresses gestation and birth, many biologically related
functions and physiological effects of a woman’s reproductive capacity are not
covered under existing law. Due to these limitations, federal courts repeatedly
deny discrimination claims involving breastfeeding and fertility treatments that
109
plaintiffs bring under the PDA. The achievement of equal employment
opportunities for women demands accommodation of these uniquely female
conditions, which can interfere with a woman’s ability to compete on an equal
basis. If provided with reasonable accommodations, many women affected by
110
their unique reproductive capacity may continue working at productive levels.
1. Breastfeeding
Although the production of breast milk is directly related to pregnancy and
women’s unique reproductive capacities, the PDA does not require employers to
111
accommodate lactation. Women’s bodies begin producing breast milk during
112
pregnancy. In addition, the body produces the hormone oxytocin in direct
113
114
response to the birth of the baby, triggering the lactation process. Therefore,
115
the production of breast milk is directly linked to pregnancy. Despite these
obvious connections between pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation, many courts

within its legal rights under the PDA to refuse accommodation and fire her. Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 551–52.
In addition, it is arguably in the employer’s best interest to provide reasonable accommodations.
Reasonable accommodations will maintain worker satisfaction and team morale, reduce turnover rates, and cut
the time and monetary costs of hiring and training new employees. See The Business Case for Breastfeeding:
Steps for Creating a Breastfeeding Friendly Worksite, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES., &
SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/government-in-action/business-case-for-breast
feeding/business-case-for-breastfeeding-for-business-managers.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing how accommodating breastfeeding actually saves employers money).
109. See infra Part IV.B.1–2 (providing case examples).
110. For instance, an employee who needs a regular water supply and, thus, requires an accommodation
that allows her to carry a water bottle, does not present a significant (if any) reduction in her productivity level.
Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009).
111. For cases holding that breastfeeding or breast-pumping and lactation do not fall under the coverage
of the PDA, see E.E.O.C. v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., No. H-11-2442, 2012 WL 739494, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
2, 2012); Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. 960
F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D. Colo. 1997); McNill v. New York, 950 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wallace v.
Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
112. Breastfeeding: Overview, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/firstyearof
life/breastfeedingoverview.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
113. Definition of Lactation, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?article
key=6202 (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 112–14 (demonstrating the clear link between pregnancy and the production of
breast milk).
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hold that the PDA does not apply to workplace discrimination based on
116
breastfeeding.
In McNill v. New York Department of Correction, the plaintiff’s child was
born with a cleft palate and lip, which required breast-feeding as opposed to
bottle-feeding prior to the corrective surgery and for several weeks thereafter
117
during the healing process. As the only individual capable of fulfilling her
118
child’s medical needs, the plaintiff could not return to work at the originally
119
agreed-upon date. In finding that breastfeeding is not a medical condition
related to pregnancy, the court reasoned that the PDA protects the mother against
120
discrimination, but not the child. This reasoning forced McNill to choose
121
between keeping her job and fulfilling her child’s medical needs. This case
demonstrates a situation in which the woman’s unique reproductive capacity
122
resulted in the loss of her job. While McNill presents a presumably rare case, it

116. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d. at 310; Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869; McNill, 950 F. Supp. at
571; Fejes, 960 F. Supp. at 1491; Houston Funding II, Ltd., 2012 WL 739494, at *1 (all holding that
breastfeeding or breast-pumping and lactation do not fall under the coverage of the PDA). While women may
choose not to breastfeed, based on the extensive medical studies and advisories, breastfeeding is the most
beneficial option for a child. See The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Support Breastfeeding, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/breastfeeding/factsheet.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Why Breastfeeding Is Important,
WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/why-breastfeeding-is-important/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Benefits of Breastfeeding, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/breastmilk/benefits.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (all explicitly stating that breastfeeding provides far better health benefits than formula for both
mother and child). Therefore, this Comment argues that breastfeeding is really not a choice for a woman. When
a couple decides to give their child the best possible nourishment via breast milk, it is always a woman who
must bear any adverse employment effects of that joint decision.
117. 950 F. Supp. at 571.
118. It may be argued that McNill could have used a wet nurse. However, the risks likely outweigh the
benefits of this solution. Milk Donations, LA LECHE LEAGUE INT’L, http://www.llli.org/llleaderweb/lv/
lvjulaug95p53.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). A wet nurse is
beneficial because McNill could continue working without requiring breastfeeding accommodations. Id.
However, risks may include transmission of bacteria or viruses, “some of which may be found in milk
expressed by asymptomatic women.” Id. Babies also require different compositions of breast milk depending on
their age. Id. The biological mother’s breast milk provides the exact composition the child requires, whereas
breast milk from a woman with a child of a different age does not. Id.
An additional burden of hiring a wet nurse is the cost. Wet nurse rates start at $1,000 per week according
to Robert Feinstock, an owner of a nationwide wet nurse agency. Jeninne Lee-St. John, Outsourcing Breast
Milk, TIME MAG. U.S. (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1612710,00.html
(citing an interview with Robert Feinstock) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Although accommodating breastfeeding requires costs to the employer, these costs are very small and
pale in comparison to the risks and monetary expense of hiring a wet nurse when the mother is fully capable of
supplying her own breast milk. See infra Part IV.B.1 (detailing the minimal requirements to accommodate
breastfeeding).
119. McNill, 950 F. Supp. at 566.
120. Id. at 571; see also Fejes, 960 F. Supp. at 1487 (“[N]eeds or conditions of the child which require
the mother’s presence are not within the scope of the PDA.”).
121. See McNill, 950 F. Supp. at 571.
122. Id. at 568 (detailing McNill’s demotion and reinstatement upon return to an inferior post).
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nonetheless shows that the lack of accommodation for a woman’s unique
reproductive capacity affected her ability to remain in the workforce and to
123
compete on an equal basis.
Lactation may also cause great discomfort and pain and, without reasonable
accommodations, may interfere with a woman’s ability to work. Women often
experience uncomfortable swelling, heaviness, hardness, and leakage as a result
124
of lactation. Lactation and continued breastfeeding also provide significant
125
health and financial benefits to both mother and child. Once again, a woman
should not be forced to choose between maintaining her health, or her child’s,
and obtaining equal employment opportunities. Periodic pumping breaks and a
private area to breastfeed are prime examples of reasonable accommodations that
will give women the opportunity to remain in the workforce and continue to
compete on an equal basis.
The Obama administration recently signed the Patient Protection and
126
Affordable Care Act, which includes an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
127
Act of 1938. This amendment requires an employer to provide reasonable
break time for a woman to pump her breast milk for one year after the birth of
128
129
her child. It also requires the employer to provide a private place to pump.
However, if an employer maintains less than fifty employees, it is exempt from
this requirement if doing so would “impose an undue hardship . . . when
considered in relation to the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the
130
employer’s business.” While this new law improves equal employment
opportunities for some women, a large number of women working for smaller
131
employers will not receive these accommodations. In addition, the law does not
address workplace discrimination against women due to lactation, nor does it
132
apply to non-exempt employees. As a result, women may still have to choose

123. Id. at 573.
124. Diana Kasdan, Reclaiming Title VII and the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace Discrimination Against
Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 309, 313 (2001) (citing Chapman et. al, Identification of Risk Factors
for Delayed Onset of Lactation, 99 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 450 (1999)).
125. See The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Support Breastfeeding, supra note 116 (providing
comprehensive overview of the benefits of breastfeeding to mother, child, and employer). Breastfeeding helps
reduce the woman’s risk of breast and ovarian cancer, and also provides crucial immune support to the child. Id.
In addition, breastfeeding can save up to $1,500 on formula in the first year as well as reduce the frequency of
illnesses and, thus, medical expenses. Id.
126. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).
128. Id. § 207(r)(1)(A).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 207(r)(3).
131. See id. (allowing employers of less than fifty to invoke an “undue hardship” defense and creating a
possible lack of accommodation for breastfeeding women working for small employers).
132. See Help Working Families Stay Healthy: Support Breastfeeding Mothers in the Workplace, U.S.
BREASTFEEDING COMM., http://www.usbreastfeeding.org/Portals/0/Advocacy/2011-BPA-Fact-Sheet-USBC.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that lactating women “are still
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between carrying out their unique reproductive roles and advancing their careers
133
or just keeping their jobs.
Although the cost of providing reasonable breastfeeding accommodations
presents a legitimate concern for employers, many sources indicate that the cost
134
is de minimus. At a minimum, lactation accommodation requires a private
135
136
area, an electrical outlet for the breast pump, and a chair. Medical
137
professionals confirm that refrigeration is not even necessary. Therefore, costs
of accommodations for lactation do not often present a strong counterargument to
requiring reasonable accommodations for lactation.
2. Fertility Treatments
While the condition of infertility affects men and women, fertility treatments
place a substantially higher burden on women, and consequently, impede their
138
ability to continue full participation in the workforce. The law remains unclear
regarding whether the PDA provides coverage for discrimination based on
139
140
infertility treatments. In Hall v. Nalco, the court found that adverse

vulnerable to being fired or discriminated against in the workplace”).
133. This Comment does not argue that all employers must accommodate lactation even in spite of high
costs or burdens. Rather, this section is included in order to illuminate the way in which women’s unique
reproductive capacities may continue to interfere with equal employment opportunities despite the currently
enacted federal laws. Therefore, enactment of a new federal law more specifically tailored to women’s unique
reproductive capacities is required.
134. Working It Out: Breastfeeding at Work, LA LECHE LEAGUE INT’L, http://www.llli.org/law/law
employment.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Kathryn Tyler, How to
Establish a Workplace Lactation Program, GOT MILK?, available at http://www.kathryntyler.com/got_
milk.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
135. Current law provides for privacy by requiring an employer to provide “a place, other than a
bathroom, that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public, which may be used
by an employee to express breast milk.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B). Thus, a small room or even a closet with a
lock will suffice for smaller employers. See FACT SHEET #73: BREAK TIME FOR NURSING MOTHERS UNDER THE
FLSA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIV., available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/
whdfs73.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing further explanation
of the room requirements for lactation accommodation).
136. Tyler, supra note 134.
137. Id. According to Marsha Walker, president of the International Lactation Consultant Association,
“[y]ou don’t need refrigeration. You can put the milk in a cooler with blue ice packs and it will keep fine.” Id.
138. See Male Infertility Overview, UP TO DATE, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/patientinformation-treatment-of-male-infertility (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(describing infertility treatments for men, assisted reproductive technologies (ART), the lack of risks to men
versus the high risk and potentially life-threatening risks to women).
139. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the PDA did not
“prohibit[] discrimination based solely on reproductive capacity”). The court distinguished between
reproductive capacity and pregnancy or related conditions. Id. It further stated that even though surgical
impregnation procedures apply only to women, the need for the procedure is traceable to both women and men.
Id. at 346. Therefore, the PDA was inapplicable. Id. Compare Govori v. Goat Fifty, No. 10 Civ. 8982(DLC),
2011 WL 1197942, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011), with Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 648• 49 (7th Cir. 2008)
(both holding that discrimination based on in vitro fertilization treatments, not fertility alone, constitutes a valid
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employment actions taken against Hall for her absences due to undergoing in
141
142
vitro fertilization (IVF) constituted a valid cause of action under the PDA.
The court reasoned that “[e]mployees terminated for taking time off to undergo
IVF—just like those terminated for taking time off to give birth or receive other
143
pregnancy-related care—will always be women.” More specifically, IVF
144
involves surgical impregnation, which can only be performed on women. Thus,
by focusing on the plaintiff’s childbearing capacity—a condition specific to
145
women—the court found discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII.
146
In a similar case, Govori v. Goat Fifty, L.L.C., the court followed Hall and
found that women fired for undergoing IVF were discriminated against based on
147
a medical condition related to pregnancy. The court cited Hall for the
proposition that “only women undergo surgical implantation procedures;
therefore, only women and not men stand in potential danger of being fired for
148
missing work for these procedures.”
Classifying surgical implantation
149
procedures as “medical conditions related to pregnancy,” the court found that
adverse employment actions for absences due to IVF constitute a cognizable
150
action under the PDA. These two cases represent the idea that fertility
treatments based on a woman’s reproductive capacity are protected by the
151
PDA.
Other courts, however, hold that surgical impregnation procedures do not fall
152
under the coverage of the PDA. For instance, in Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,
the Second Circuit stated “infertility standing alone does not fall within the
153
meaning of the phrase ‘related medical conditions’ under the PDA.” “Because
reproductive capacity is common to both men and women, we do not read the
PDA as introducing a completely new classification of prohibited discrimination
154
based solely on reproductive capacity.” Courts following this line of logic
claim of sex-discrimination under the PDA).
140. 534 F.3d at 648• 49.
141. In vitro fertilization, or IVF, is a type of “assisted reproductive technology (ART)” by which
“special medical techniques are used to help a woman become pregnant.” In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MEDLINE
PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007279.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
142. Hall, 534 F.3d at 649.
143. Id. at 648• 49.
144. Id. at 649.
145. Id. at 648• 49.
146. No. 10 Civ. 8982(DLC), 2011 WL 1197942 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011).
147. Id. at *4.
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.; Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008).
152. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 345.
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reason that infertility affects both men and women and, thus, infertility is not a
155
medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth for purposes of the PDA.
When looking at the different medical procedures required to address
infertility in men and women, focusing on infertility alone provides too narrow
156
an analysis. Although infertility affects both men and women, treating
infertility poses more severe health risks for women and more physically
157
demanding, time-consuming procedures. According to the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, “most cases [of] infertility [are] treated with drugs or
158
159
surgery.” The fertility drugs administered to women require monitoring in the
160
form of ultrasounds, blood estrogen levels, and urinary hormone testing. Many
of these treatments also have variable responses for different women, so each
161
patient’s treatment and monitoring regimens will differ.
Some women
experience mild side effects of fertility drugs, while others experience more
162
severe complications. These different responses and monitoring necessities
further demonstrate that discrimination based on a woman’s reproductive
163
capacity does not fit into the comparator-based evaluation.
Women also undergo surgical procedures to address infertility. These
procedures, known as assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), include the
164
IVF process. Risks of assisted reproductive techniques for women include,
among other things, infection, damage to organs, and ovarian hyperstimulation
165
syndrome, which may cause death. In addition, statistics indicate that women
have higher infertility rates than men, which logically results in women
166
undergoing fertility treatments more frequently. On the other hand, “there are
155. La Porta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 770–71 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
156. It should be noted that men also undergo fertility treatments and procedures. See generally Male
Infertility Overview, supra note 138. However, an examination of the discrimination men face based on this
condition falls outside of the coverage of the PDA as well as the scope of this Comment.
157. Male Infertility Overview, supra note 138.
158. Infertility FAQ’s, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
reproductivehealth/Infertility/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
159. Such drugs include: Clomiphene Citrate, Human Menopausal Gonadotropin, Follicle Stimulating
Hormone, and Human Chorionic Gonadotropin. Ovulation Induction, UCSF MED. CTR., http://www.
ucsfhealth.org/education/ovulation_induction/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Fertility Drugs, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/guide/fertilitydrugs?page=2 (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing side effects ranging
from “headaches and dizziness to ovarian hyperstimulation and multiple pregnancy, which present health risks
for both mother and child”).
163. See Part IV.A (detailing the inadequacies of the comparator-based approach).
164. See Infertility FAQ’s, supra note 158 (describing several types of ARTs, including in vitro
fertilization).
165. Id.
166. See id. (explaining that infertility cases in developed countries consist of eight percent, which are
traceable to male factors versus thirty-seven percent traceable to female factors. The other cases can be traced to
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167

few to no risks [of ARTs] for men.” Men have a small chance of “bleeding,
168
damage to the testes, and infection.”
If a woman must miss work to undergo fertility treatments or she experiences
severe side effects from the procedures, an employer should not be permitted to
take adverse employment actions against her based on her reproductive capacity.
As detailed above, women disproportionately bear the burden of invasive
physical procedures, time off of work to undergo treatment and monitoring, and
169
risky health complications related to fertility treatments. All of these issues will
almost certainly interfere with her ability to work.
While the courts that follow the Hall and Govori line of reasoning recognize
that a woman’s unique reproductive capacity affords her a remedy for
170
discrimination based on fertility treatments such as IVF, courts that follow Saks
171
do not recognize this protection. In order for women to be afforded truly equal
employment opportunities, the laws related to women’s reproductive capacities
must allow for accommodations in appropriate infertility situations. Recognizing
that accommodations in certain infertility-related situations will afford equal
employment opportunities can eliminate women having to choose between
fulfilling their unique reproductive roles and maintaining employment.
V. AN ACCOMMODATION APPROACH TO PREGNANCY
Section A first explains the need for an accommodation approach by showing
the inadequacy of the comparator-based method due to the wide-range of
experiences even among pregnant women. Section A further explains the
inapplicability of other laws such as the FMLA to the situations of many
pregnant women, thus creating the need for an accommodation approach. Section
B of this Part describes the ADA and Congress’s intent to alleviate the problems
that this Comment is concerned with. This Section then explains the pregnancyrelated conditions, which would fall under the coverage of the ADA if such
conditions were not caused by pregnancy. Finally, this Part concludes by
proposing a new federal law, modeled after the ADA, to provide reasonable
accommodations for pregnancy and related reproductive conditions.

both female and male partners or the source of infertility cannot be determined).
167. Male Infertility Overview, supra note 138.
168. Id.
169. See generally supra Part IV.B.2 (explaining in detail the disproportionate impact of fertility
treatments on women as opposed to men).
170. Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008); Govori v. Goat Fifty, L.L.C., No. 10
CIV.8982(DLC), 2011 WL 1197942, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011).
171. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003).
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A. The Need for Accommodation
Under an accommodation approach, employers must make reasonable
accommodations based on the needs of the individual woman rather than
considering whether accommodations are already being provided to similarly
172
situated individuals. An accommodation approach, as opposed to a comparatorbased approach, is necessary to address the barriers to equal employment
opportunities presented by women’s unique reproductive capacities. Under the
current comparative approach of the PDA, an employer is only required to
accommodate a woman for pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,
if and to the extent that they already accommodate an employee who is “similarly
173
situated” to the woman.
The main factor supporting an accommodation approach is that there is no
similarly situated class—no men who will ever get pregnant. In addition, when a
couple chooses to have a child, only a woman is able to get pregnant in order to
fulfill that choice. Only women will experience disruptions to their ability to
work as a result of pregnancy and their unique reproductive capacity. Even the
“normal” pregnancies present some disruption to a woman’s ability to work. At
the very least, a pregnant woman will experience hormonal changes, a growing
abdomen, weight gain, breast changes, fetal movement, and increased blood
174
volume. Other pregnancy side effects usually considered “normal” to a healthy
pregnancy include: nausea, fatigue, increased urination, heartburn, headaches,
mood swings, dizziness, leg cramps, shortness of breath, backaches, lifting
175
restrictions, and swelling.
176
While these “normal” disruptive symptoms clearly interfere with a
177
pregnant woman’s ability to perform at optimum work levels, even greater
problems arise when a woman experiences side effects not typical to most
pregnancies. Side effects such as depression, gestational diabetes, and severe,
178
persistent nausea and vomiting undeniably infringe upon the woman’s ability to
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2006) (requiring reasonable accommodation under the ADA).
173. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the comparative analysis under the PDA).
174. Stages of Pregnancy, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-are-pregnant
/stages-of-pregnancy.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
175. First Trimester Pregnancy: What to Expect, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/
health/pregnancy/PR00004 (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Second
Trimester Pregnancy: What to Expect, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pregnancy/PR00018
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Third Trimester Pregnancy: What to
Expect, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pregnancy/PR00009 (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
176. The term “normal” is used in this Comment to refer to pregnancy symptoms without medical
complications.
177. For example, the “normal” symptoms just listed may interfere with a woman’s level of alertness
due to increased fatigue, she may require slightly more time away from her desk in order to use the restroom, or
she may need to rest for a few minutes in order to catch her breath.
178. Stages of Pregnancy, supra note 174.
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work. Furthermore, female-specific reproductive concerns, outside the strict
timeframe of gestation and birth, present additional concerns for women
179
specifically because of their unique reproductive capacity.
The fact that pregnancy experiences and side effects vary even among
members of the same class further supports the uniqueness of each individual
case and indicates the inadequacy of the comparative method of evaluation. This
wide-range of experiences makes the identification of an acceptable comparator
impossible and explains why an accommodation approach is more appropriate to
provide equal employment opportunities for women. Some women experience
little-to-no problems, while others experience severely debilitating and,
180
consequently, life-interfering conditions. For instance, ectopic pregnancies, in
which the egg implants outside of the uterus, may require surgery to avoid organ
181
damage. Another condition, hyperemesis gravidarum (HG), involves severe,
182
persistent nausea and vomiting throughout the pregnancy. Women experiencing
severe cases of HG may require hospitalization in order to “be fed fluids and
183
nutrients through a tube in their veins.”
Although some may argue that a pregnant woman experiencing severe
complications may use sick leave, vacation time, or take unpaid leave under the
184
FMLA, these options may not apply to a substantial number of pregnant
185
women. For example, if she experiences a complication throughout her entire
pregnancy, she may not be entitled to enough sick days or vacation time under
her employer’s policy in order to allow her to deal with her pregnancy
186
complications. Similarly, under the FMLA, a woman must be employed for at
least twelve months and at least 1,250 hours within the preceding twelve-month
187
period in order to qualify for leave under the FMLA. The FMLA also does not

179. See supra Part IV (providing more detailed explanation of these female-specific reproductive
functions, such as breastfeeding and infertility treatments, and their interference with a woman’s ability to
work).
180. Stages of Pregnancy, supra note 174; Second Trimester Pregnancy: What to Expect, supra note
175.
181. Pregnancy Complications, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-arepregnant/pregnancy-complications.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
185. FMLA Facts and Statistics, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, http://www.aauw.org/act/laf/library/fm
lastatistics.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The American Association
of University Women indicates that about 40% of workers are not eligible to receive FMLA leave. Id.
Concededly, it may not be possible to provide accommodations for all pregnant women due to the cost
burdens imposed upon employers; the new proposed law attempts to reach a larger number while still
recognizing the cost implications and burdens for employers.
186. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is only entitled to twelve
workweeks of leave in a one-year period. Id.
187. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(i).
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188

apply to employers with less than fifty employees. Even if a pregnant woman
qualifies for leave under the FMLA, she is only entitled to twelve-weeks of
189
unpaid leave. The lack of pay presents additional challenges because this
remedy assumes that the woman is financially able to take this extended period
190
of unpaid leave.
B. Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

191

Because the PDA is ineffective and does not provide for reasonable
accommodations, it is useful to look at how an accommodation model might
192
work. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) represents an existing legal
structure for accommodating certain conditions, which demonstrates recognition
of the unique obstacles to equal employment opportunities that certain conditions
may present. Under the ADA, “discrimination” includes not reasonably
accommodating known physical or mental limitations if the disabled employee
193
(or applicant) is otherwise qualified for the job. The ADA does not require an
employer to make reasonable accommodations for an individual if it can
demonstrate that doing so would impose “undue hardship” on business
194
operations. “Disability” is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such
195
an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment.”
196
Although the ADA regulations specifically reject pregnancy as a disability,
analyzing the nature of pregnancy explains why an accommodation approach can
work. Similar to conditions covered by the ADA, pregnancy often involves side
197
effects that interfere with a woman’s ability to perform certain job functions.

188. Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii).
189. Id. § 2612(a)(1), (c).
190. See id. § 2612(c) (indicating the allowance of unpaid leave under the FMLA).
191. While some may argue that pregnancy conditions should be accommodated under the ADA, this
Comment proposes a new law to accommodate pregnancy because pregnancy should not be classified as a
disability. Rather than classifying pregnancy as a disability, it should be viewed as the unique ability of women
to bear children. Only women get pregnant and experience the unique conditions of reproductive capacity. As a
class, women have overcome centuries of oppression and a long history of employment discrimination. Even
today women have not yet fully achieved equal employment opportunities. Recognizing pregnancy and
reproductive capacity as distinct from disabilities will ensure the continued efforts to equalize working women’s
opportunities with respect to men in relation to their unique childbearing and reproductive capacities. But see
Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as ‘Disability’ and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV.
443 (2012) (arguing that the ADA should extend coverage to pregnant women because they experience
conditions that are already accommodated under the ADA).
192. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
193. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B).
194. Id.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B).
196. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2011).
197. See supra Part V.A.
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ADA coverage extends to an impairment that “substantially limits one or more of
198
[an individual’s] major life activities . . . .” Major life activities covered under
the ADA, which are frequently associated with pregnancy and reproductive
199
capacity, include: performing manual tasks, walking, and working. The ADA
requires reasonable accommodations for such conditions if adjustments will
permit the qualified employee to receive the “benefits and privileges of
200
employment equal to those enjoyed by employees without disabilities.”
Women may experience impairments similar to those recognized under the ADA,
on a temporary basis, as a result of pregnancy or inability to become pregnant, in
the case of fertility treatments. Although their ability with respect to these tasks
may be temporarily impaired, many pregnant women may continue to work at a
competent level with reasonable accommodations.
Further justification for accommodating pregnancy is found in the
similarities between the effects of pregnancy discrimination and the problems the
201
legislature sought to address with enacting the ADA. One of the main purposes
for enacting the ADA was prohibiting discrimination. The Findings and Purpose
states that discrimination “denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free
202
society is justifiably famous . . . .” In addition, statistics show that people with
disabilities occupy an inferior status in society and are “socially, vocationally,
203
economically, and educationally disadvantaged.” According to the United
States Office of the Attorney General, accommodation is necessary because
“integration is fundamental to the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities
204
Act.”
Accommodation provisions attempt to “prohibit exclusion and
segregation of individuals with disabilities” and alleviate the denial of equal
205
opportunities to these individuals. Without accommodations such as ramps or
braille text, wheelchair users and blind individuals, respectively, are “relegate[d]
206
. . . to second-class status.”
As demonstrated above, the ADA aims to address the very issue that this
Comment is concerned with: achieving equal employment opportunities by
providing accommodation for certain conditions. Unfortunately, the ADA
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
199. See The ADA: Your Responsibilities as an Employer, U.S. EQUAL EMPL. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada17.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(providing examples of activities restricted by a disability that warrant accommodations under the ADA).
200. Id.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (findings and purpose).
202. Id.
203. Id. § 12101(a)(6).
204. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, available at http://www.ada.gov/reg2.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
205. Id.
206. Id.

537

08_OYOUNG_VER_01_7-20-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/29/2013 10:17 AM

2013 / Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace
207

regulations specifically reject pregnancy as a disability covered under the law.
While this Comment does not argue that pregnancy should be covered under the
ADA, it is important to note that women discriminated against on the basis of
pregnancy may not seek a cause of action under the ADA; therefore, the PDA
provides the only current legal cause of action for women discriminated against
208
on the basis of pregnancy. As previously explained, remedies under the PDA
209
are ineffective.
210
Similar to the disabilities of individuals protected by the ADA, pregnancy
and motherhood often interfere with women’s ability to compete equally with
non-pregnant persons. For instance, in Troupe v. May Department Stores, Co.,
Troupe’s employer fired her for absences due to morning sickness even though
she experienced abnormally severe effects of pregnancy and provided a doctor’s
211
212
note. Troupe sued under the PDA, but failed. The court granted the
employer’s motion for summary judgment, stating “[t]he Pregnancy
Discrimination Act does not . . . require employers to offer maternity leave or
take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work . . . to make it as
213
easy, say as it is for their spouse to continue working during pregnancy.” The
court further revealed the potential for discriminatory treatment of pregnant
women under the PDA by stating that “[e]mployers can treat pregnant women as
214
badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees . . . .”
Troupe’s discrimination claim ultimately failed because of the comparator215
216
based analysis. She was unable to identify “a hypothetical Mr. Troupe” as
tardy as she was, experiencing health problems that also required sick leave equal
217
in length to her maternity leave, but who was not fired. Ms. Troupe likely could
have kept her job and received employment opportunities equal to individuals not
affected by pregnancy if her case had been evaluated under an accommodation
218
standard.

207. 42 C.F.R. app § 1630.2(h) (2011). “Other conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a
physiological disorder are also not impairments.” Id.
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (providing that Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”).
209. See generally supra Part IV (detailing the insufficient protection of pregnant women under the
PDA).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (findings and purpose).
211. 20 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994).
212. Id. at 739.
213. Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
214. Id.
215. See id. (comparing the plaintiff’s situation to “a hypothetical Mr. Troupe”).
216. See id. (discussing Ms. Troupe’s inability to show a “hypothetical Mr. Troupe” in order to apply
the comparator-based approach).
217. Id.
218. See infra note 235 (applying an accommodation approach to Ms. Troupe’s situation).
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C. A New Federal Law Accommodating Pregnancy
This Comment proposes a federal law requiring reasonable accommodation
for women’s unique reproductive capacities. This approach closely follows
219
current California law. Under current California law, “unless based upon a
220
bona fide occupational qualification,” it is unlawful for employers to “refuse to
provide reasonable accommodation for an employee for conditions related to
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, if she so requests, with the
221
advice of her health care provider.” However, unlike the California law, the
new law will replace the term “medical” with “reproductive,” thus requiring
employers to provide reasonable accommodations related to pregnancy,
childbirth, or a related reproductive condition. Deleting “medical” as a
222
requirement provides broader coverage for women. It is necessary to delete the
qualifier “medical” because many courts have interpreted this term narrowly, to
223
the detriment of women pursuing a remedy under California’s law. For
instance, in Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., the court explicitly stated that
breastfeeding, although a “natural concomitant[] of pregnancy and childbirth, . . .
224
[is] not [a] ‘medical condition[]’ related thereto.” The “related reproductive
conditions” term is necessary because even “healthy” or “normal” pregnancies
225
can interfere with a woman’s ability to work. “Related reproductive conditions”
should include any condition that results from a woman’s unique reproductive
capacity. For instance, breastfeeding and fertility treatments should receive
226
coverage as a condition related to a woman’s reproductive capacity. The
proposed law will keep the provision requiring the advice of a medical
professional in order to mitigate the possibility of unnecessary accommodation
requests.

219. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945 (West 2011).
220. Id. § 12945. “Bona Fide Occupational Qualification” is defined as a practice of exclusion which is
justified because “all or substantially all of the excluded individuals are unable to safely and efficiently perform
the job in question and because the essence of the business operation would otherwise be undermined.” 2 CCR
§ 7286.7(a) (2012).
221. GOV’T § 12945(b)(3)(A).
222. This broader coverage of women, admittedly, means that it also extends application to a larger
number of employees. However, employers will be exempt from providing an accommodation if they can prove
that it will cause undue hardship.
223. See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (finding that
breastfeeding is not a related medical condition); Williams v. MacFrugal’s Bargains-Close-Outs, Inc., 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 98 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a hysterectomy is not a related medical condition).
224. Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869.
225. See generally supra Part V.A (describing the normal symptoms of all pregnancies which may still
prove disruptive to everyday life).
226. See supra Part IV.B.1–2 (presenting arguments for insufficient coverage under current law for
conditions outside the direct scope of pregnancy and gestation); see also Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d
337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (specifically stating that infertility “does not fall within the meaning of the phrase
related medical conditions under the PDA”).
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Similar to California, the statute’s use of “reasonable accommodations” may
include “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and
227
usable by, individuals with disabilities,” or job restructuring, modified work
schedules, reassignment, modifications to examinations, policies, and other
similar adaptations for individuals experiencing pregnancy or conditions related
228
to the unique female reproductive capacity. However, an employer is not
required to provide reasonable accommodations if it can prove that doing so
would cause undue hardship. This undue hardship shall be determined using a
229
totality of the circumstances test, where the court balances factors including,
230
“size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s business.” The
employer will bear the burden of proving that providing the necessary
231
accommodations would impose “significant difficulty or expense” in light of
the factors. Since the size of the employer is one of the factors to consider, there
232
will not be a minimum employee requirement for this law. Rather, the undue
hardship element should provide adequate protection to small employers unable
to bear the burden of providing the necessary accommodations while still
233
maintaining a viable business.
In summary, the new proposed federal law will state:
1. Unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, it is
234
unlawful
for an employer to refuse to provide reasonable
accommodation for an employee who requests such accommodation,
with the advice of her healthcare provider, for a condition related to:
a. Pregnancy;
b. Childbirth; or
c. Other related reproductive conditions.

227. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(n)(1) (West 2011).
228. Id. § 12926(n)(2).
229. Using a totality of the circumstances test provides a different and more comprehensive evaluation
of whether an accommodation truly imposes an undue hardship than the previously referenced laws. See, e.g.,
29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(3) (Supp. IV 2011) (permitting any employer with less than fifty employees to attempt to
raise an undue hardship defense to providing a break time for nursing mothers).
230. Id.
231. GOV’T § 12926(t).
232. California excuses employers with less than five employees. Id. § 12926(d). While this limited
application is an attempt to balance the cost burdens imposed upon employers, it is unnecessary to specify an
arbitrary number of employees. Rather, the burden upon the employer to prove undue hardship suffices to show
that the employer cannot withstand the cost burdens of providing accommodations.
233. Restructuring the undue hardship element in this manner aims to ensure that only those employers
whose businesses will be direly affected by such accommodations may be excused.
234. This proposed law will provide a civil cause of action to employees who were wrongfully denied
reasonable accommodations for pregnancy or related reproductive conditions.
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2. An employer is not required to provide reasonable accommodations
if the employer can prove that doing so would cause undue hardship
based on the totality of the circumstances.
Under this new law, the woman’s needs will be evaluated in conjunction with
the employer’s ability to provide reasonable accommodations to fit these needs.
If an employer is able to provide reasonable accommodations without
experiencing an undue hardship, women should be allowed to continue
productively contributing to the workforce and not be held back by their unique
235
reproductive capacities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current federal law does not adequately address the barriers to equal
employment opportunities that women face due to their unique reproductive
capacities. Although the PDA is specifically designed to recognize women’s role
236
in reproduction, it is limited in its coverage of a woman’s general reproductive
237
capacity. Additionally, under the PDA’s structural framework, discrimination is
judged by comparing the plaintiff’s situation to treatment of other similarly
238
situated employees. This results in inadequate protection of women because
239
there is no similarly situated class for purposes of comparison. Only women
experience these unique conditions, and accommodations must be made in order
240
for women as a class to receive equal employment opportunities.
Since the comparison approach does not provide sufficient protection for
working women, an accommodation approach is necessary to adequately address
241
this issue. This accommodation approach may be achieved through enacting a
new federal law that requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations
for pregnant employees as well as women affected by their reproductive capacity,
242
pregnancy, childbirth, or related reproductive conditions. Under this new law,
rather than comparing pregnant women to other “similarly situated” classes,

235. If the Troupe court had applied this accommodation approach to Ms. Troupe’s case, she would not
have been required to find a comparable male receiving better treatment. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, Co.,
20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring a comparable “Mr. Troupe”). Rather, her individual condition and
accommodation requirements would be evaluated on their own merits. But cf. id. (applying a comparator
analysis to plaintiff’s discrimination claim under the ADA).
236. See Hunt-Golliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act brought discrimination based on pregnancy within a woman’s protections against
sex discrimination.”).
237. See supra Part IV.B.
238. See supra Part IV.A.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra Part V.A.
242. See supra Part V.C.
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employers must consider the specific needs of these women on an individual
243
basis in order to determine what types of accommodations are necessary. Until
men can bear children, women must not bear the costs that their unique
reproductive capacity imposes upon their ability to achieve equal employment
opportunities.

243. Id.
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